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Abstract  
There are considerable benefits from cooperating among member states on meeting the 2020 
renewable energy sources (RES) targets. Today countries are supporting investments in 
renewable energy by many different types of support schemes and with different levels of 
support. The EU has opened for cooperation mechanisms such as joint support schemes for 
promoting renewable energy to meet the 2020 targets. The potential coordination benefits, with 
more efficient localisation and composition of renewable investment, can be achieved by 
creating new areas/sub-segments of renewable technologies where support costs are shared and 
credits are transferred between countries. 
Countries that are not coordinating support for renewable energy might induce inefficient 
investment in new capacity that would have been more beneficial elsewhere and still have 
provided the same contribution to meeting the 2020 RES targets. Furthermore, countries might 
find themselves competing for investment in a market with limited capital available. In both 
cases, the cost-efficiency of the renewable support policies is reduced compared to a coordinated 
solution. 
Barriers for joint support such as network regulation regarding connection of new capacity to 
the electricity grid and cost sharing rules for electricity transmission expansion are examined 
and examples given. The influence of additional renewable capacity on domestic/regional power 
market prices can be a barrier. The market will be influenced by for example an expansion of the 
wind capacity resulting in lower prices, which will affect existing conventional producers. This 
development will be opposed by conventional producers, whereas consumers will support such a 
strategy.        
A major barrier is the timing of RES targets and the uncertainty regarding future targets. We 
illustrate the importance of different assumptions on future targets and the implied value of RES 
credits. The effect on the credit price for 2020 is presented in an exemplary case study of 200MW 
wind capacity. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has defined an overall target for renewable energy of 20% in 2020. 
The required total addition of renewable energy for the EU has been distributed among the 
Member States (MS) and translated into national targets for renewable energy taking into 
account selected parameters. The national targets are mainly based on an equal increase from the 
respective shares in 2005. The income level is one additional parameter: a slightly higher burden 
is put on wealthier countries.  However, no consideration has been made to integrating cost 
efficient implementation into the allocation of national targets. Tolon-Becerra et. al. [1] examine 
alternative distribution weights among EU member state targets and illustrate that the targets 
chosen by the EU could be substantially different for some countries if more or less weight is put 
on initial energy consumption per capita or income levels/GDP. While the different weights in 
the analysis of Tolon-Becerra et. al. [1] do not intend to minimise costs of meeting the aggregate 
20% EU target in 2020, it shows that the resulting target allocation can vary significantly, 
depending on the parameters chosen. The cost differences across Europe of implementing 
renewable investment have not been directly included in setting the targets. Since these cost 
differences can be significant for some technologies and regions, there exist potential benefits if 
some of the investment needed to comply with the overall European target could be re-allocated 
from countries with high cost renewable options to countries with lower cost options. This will 
lead to overall reduced compliance cost in Europe. These potential benefits could be realised if 
countries are allowed to implement their targets jointly. An overview of quantitative studies 
indicating the possible gains due to cooperation is given in [2]. With the Directive 2009/28/EC 
[3], EU legislation has opened for cooperation mechanisms to benefit from efficiency gains. 
They comprise joint support schemes, joint projects and statistical transfers as support for 
promoting renewable energy to meet the 2020 targets. The details for these mechanisms have not 
been laid out yet. A communication from the commission in 2013 [4] strengthens the call for 
more initiatives on cooperation as the target achievement in 2020 has become uncertain as 
member states have taken insufficient actions on reducing barriers and reductions in national 
incentives/support for renewables has reduced medium term prospect for meeting trajectory 
targets.    
Despite the national characteristics of support mechanism choice, [5] argue that national schemes 
are converging to a certain extent, possibly facilitating multilateral agreements on joint support. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the barriers for cooperation mechanisms and possible 
policy solutions. Furthermore, the article investigates the importance of future RES targets for 
cooperation mechanisms. It takes thus a more general approach than [6], who illustrate the 
possible combination of support schemes and cooperation mechanisms specifically for offshore 
wind energy. The least complicated mechanism is the statistical transfer, an ex-post transfer of 
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virtual RES certificates that can be used for target compliance. This mechanism depends directly 
on governmental involvement and can also be associated with the other mechanisms at the final 
stage of transferring the achieved RES certificates from one country to another. As Klessmann et 
al. (2010) [7] argue, statistical transfers are not expected to induce significant amounts of 
additional RES development. They argue further that statistical transfers will most likely be used 
as an ex-post allocation mechanism for excess certificates rather than as a mechanism to 
strategically increase the efficiency in the distribution of RES development. Due to the incentive 
structure behind this mechanism, it is expected that only very limited ‘statistical transfer-
volumes’ will be available to MS for complying with their target in 2020 [4]. The reason is that, 
if this mechanism should be used as strategic instrument rather than as an ad-hoc means of 
‘filling the gaps’, MS would have to guarantee the delivery of RES certificates under a statistical 
transfer several years prior to 2020 so that the receiving MS can avoid the development of own 
RES production. However, many MS (especially those using feed-in tariffs or other non 
quantity-driven support systems) will not be able to guarantee delivery long before 2020, as they 
will be uncertain in regards to their own target compliance. Therefore, sharing of compliance risk 
would be a critical issue in agreements on statistical transfers ex ante. A case study from an 
Austrian perspective on this issue is provided in [8], finding that joint support could minimise the 
EU-wide support sum by several billion Euro. For the Austrian case, the authors argue that the 
country could strive to over achieve its RES targets as a hedge against variations in other factors 
and, if not required, sell excess generation under a statistical transfer. 
This paper is structured as follows: We first provide an overview of the possible sources of 
benefits from cooperating on meeting renewable targets in section 2. In section 3 follows an 
investigation of the barriers for cooperation mechanisms. Finally, section 4 examines the 
importance of post 2020 RES targets for cooperation design and credit transfer pricing. Section 5 
presents the conclusions.  
2. Potential benefits of cooperation 
Countries that are designing their support schemes for renewable energy independently might 
induce inefficient investment in new capacity that would have been more beneficial abroad and 
still provide the same contribution to meeting the European 2020 RES targets. Additionally, the 
countries might also find themselves competing for investment in a market with limited capital 
available. In both cases, the cost-efficiency of the renewable support policies will be reduced 
relative to a coordinated solution.  
The fact that a country actually has difficulties meeting their own 2020 RES target, for example 
due to limited resources or adverse market conditions, is not the determining factor for whether a 
country will benefit from cooperation. Assuming that the costs of installing the marginal RES 
unit in one country is less than the costs of installing the marginal RES unit in another country, 
the country with the highest marginal costs of RES will benefit from installing its RES in the 
first country. Furthermore, as the countries will enter an agreement sharing the total savings, the 
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country with the lowest marginal RES costs also benefit from cooperation. A country-to-country 
trading approach has been found superior to a trading system between companies [9].  
In this paper, we look mainly on a situation where there are considerable benefits caused by large 
differences in RES costs and differences in other parameters such as power prices that can 
facilitate secondary benefits as well. The benefits of cooperation can be grouped into two 
categories: 
 
1. Primary benefits: reduced target compliance costs 
2. Secondary benefits: e.g. reduced cost in electricity supply and faster RE technological 
progress 
2.1 Primary benefits 
Cooperation and coordination across countries can contribute to a more efficient expansion of 
renewable generation in Europe and can therefore reduce the costs of compliance with the 2020 
renewable targets. Often, the main potentials for addition of renewable energy are located in 
border areas between markets with different support schemes and different rules for market 
access, market integration (incl. balancing responsibility) and development of transmission 
capacity. It can be expected that benefits can be harnessed especially in these areas. The main 
cost reduction can be expected from direct RES costs, but the value of the potential generation 
depends heavily on the power market structure and generating capacity mix in general.  
The larger the difference between marginal costs of RES expansion between two countries, the 
larger the benefits of jointly meeting the targets will be since the country with the very high costs 
of RES expansion will face substantially lower costs exploiting the opportunity to install the RES 
in another country. The cost reduction will not be equally shared between the two countries in 
the first place. This stresses the need for the participating countries to develop a mechanism 
securing proper sharing of the cooperation benefits. 
2.2 Secondary benefits 
It is quite important that the primary benefits, given by reduced costs of compliance with 2020 
renewable targets, are not achieved at the expense of secondary objectives of the national RES 
policies. The secondary group of benefits of cooperation accounts for the less measurable 
benefits as well as other secondary policy objectives. Among these count:  
 Power generation efficiency 
 Employment effects 
 Security of supply 
 Investor risk 
 Political risk 
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Power generation efficiency 
Increased cooperation could reduce power generation costs by allocating more renewable 
investments to countries where they replace existing inefficient power capacity. This is for 
example the case where additional power generation capacity is actually required to enable 
scrapping of very old capacity, as compared to countries where additional renewable generation 
will replace relatively new and efficient conventional generation. As the short term marginal 
costs of electricity production from RES are expected to be less than the short term marginal cost 
of conventional (fossil) technologies, price reductions in electricity supply are expected. 
However, this is not an efficiency increase since it is the long term costs that exhibit the 
economic efficiency. Cooperation projects that involve expanding the interconnection capacities, 
for example to bring offshore wind power a-shore in a high price area would certainly also 
improve the generation allocation efficiency.  These efficiency benefits will not necessarily be 
evenly distributed and the price effects most likely will be different in cooperating countries. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency improvement could provide an important net benefit that could 
accrue to the country that only has limited direct benefits from the reduction of RES target 
compliance costs.  
Employment effects 
Investment in renewable deployment creates temporary employment in the construction phase, 
and permanent employment in operation and maintenance [10-15]. The short term employment 
benefit is often assumed to affect more remote areas with weak employment opportunities [14] to 
a higher degree than conventional power plant investments. Permanent jobs are also for some 
renewable technologies (biomass) seen as exceeding the number of jobs that they replace in the 
conventional generation [10].  
Security of supply 
Another benefit from cooperation across countries is increased security of supply. This is 
especially the case if cooperation involves increased interconnection capacity. Interconnection 
will also reduce the reserve capacity requirement and thereby costs of securing supply. 
Additionally, possible positive effects from harmonising connection, planning, and support 
administrative procedures will lead to faster implementation of best practices and thus improved 
security of supply. 
Investor risk 
One of the barriers for investors in terms of investing in renewable energy is the regulatory risk. 
Facing a new technology investors being uncertain of the future support policy will choose to 
invest their money in other markets. However, joint support schemes across countries targeting 
the 2020 RES targets will imply a larger degree of certainty as a change in the support scheme 
would be equal to a breach of international contracts and is therefore not expected.  
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Political risk 
Finally, reduced political risk represents a secondary benefit of cooperation. The risk of not 
complying with the 2020 RES targets for the country initially being in lack of renewable 
capacity will be strongly reduced if not eliminated.   
Since the secondary benefits as a point of departure is rather difficult to measure monetarily in 
contrast to the primary benefits (see above), the risk that the primary benefits are achieved at the 
expense of some secondary benefits must be minimised. 
The potential secondary coordination benefits with more efficient localisation and composition 
of renewable investment can be partly achieved by creating new areas and sub-segments of 
renewable technologies where support costs and credits are shared. Such a solution enables the 
parties to avoid loss of secondary benefits that are linked to their own national support policies 
for all the RES not included in the new cooperation.  
3. Barriers for cooperation 
The overall prerequisite is that MS will only agree on a cooperation mechanism if they both 
benefit from it. A mutually beneficial situation can be achieved if the overall benefits are greater 
than the overall cost and if the costs and benefits are allocated between the MS in an adequate 
way. 
Klessmann (2009) [15] describes the different elements of costs and benefits for each MS under 
a cooperation mechanism: The primary costs are the support for the produced RES electricity 
(i.e. feed-in premiums). The primary benefit is the contribution to RES target compliance. As 
described in the previous section, there are a number of secondary cost and benefits that require 
additional adjustments to allocation agreements. Difficulties in quantifying these secondary costs 
and benefits may lead to certain barriers for the implementation of cooperation mechanisms. In 
[16], an overview of all the possible barriers for cooperation is provided and the most severe 
identified. In some situations the secondary benefits will be entirely shifted between MS in 
cooperation and this could be effectively hindering the cooperation.  
Especially local benefits (jobs, security of supply, innovation, export options) are often 
mentioned as a significant element by political decision makers. Therefore, they constitute a 
barrier if they will be negatively affected in one of the countries engaging in cooperation. 
Additionally, the compensation for such losses are very hard to translate into a quantifiable price 
premium on the RES-certificate transfer price. The value of these effects is expected to be 
relatively limited compared to the primary effects, and is therefore not included in this paper.  
Another relevant barrier is the one arising as a result of different policy objectives of the support 
schemes. Objectives may be to 1) maintain support for diversified technologies in order to 
increase political acceptance or to 2) target the support in order to develop specific RES 
technologies and industries. Furthermore, different levels of support as well as the usage of 
different support mechanisms may appear to constitute barriers to cooperation. We therefore 
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suggest that, for example, feed-in tariffs for the cooperation can be set at levels that diverge from 
the rest of the national renewable market without distorting the intended composition in the 
national market. 
Barriers also include the influence on domestic/regional power market prices. One market will be 
influenced by for example wind expansion with lower prices that will reduce earnings for 
existing conventional producers. Such a development will be opposed by existing producers 
whereas consumers, who will benefit from it, will support such a strategy. However, the 
investment will be influenced by decisions of producers as well as the possibility of increasing 
connection to other markets with higher market prices, which could reduce the effect of the 
increased RES capacity on the market price. 
Finally, there are several other issues that can constitute possible barriers, such as how to 
structure the agreements legally, how to allocate cost of joint support into the PSO (Public 
Service Obligations) payments for consumers, etc. These issues are not perceived as major 
barriers and are expected to be fairly easy to overcome [16].  
Table 1 Cooperation mechanism characteristics, barriers and solutions 
Cooperation 
mechanism 
Primary cost 
saving 
potential 
Secondary 
benefits involved 
Barriers for 
implementation 
Solution for 
barriers 
Possible time 
horizon for 
implementation 
Harmonised 
joint support 
scheme 
 
Large  
A full 
harmonised 
system without 
technology 
differentiation of 
support yields the 
highest efficiency 
gain 
Larger markets,  
More competition, 
National secondary 
support objectives 
difficult to maintain  
Harmonisation in 
other market 
conditions and 
increased power 
market integration 
Considerable 
time delays in 
legislation,  
Difficult to 
compensate directly 
the losers, 
National control of 
support policy 
reduced 
Compensation 
mechanisms and 
cooperation on 
reaching secondary 
objectives (infant 
industries, employment 
and diversification of 
technologies), 
Allocation of net 
benefits to losers 
Complicated and 
requires national 
legislation delays 
Long term option 
Local/regional  
joint support 
scheme  
Medium level 
Advantage for 
countries with 
shared/bordering 
resources 
Maintained national 
support for not 
covered areas and 
technologies expand 
excess resources 
Opposition to 
favoring investment 
in one area opposed 
to those areas 
covered by national 
scheme 
 
Replicate one system 
from one of the 
cooperating countries – 
limited legislative 
delay 
Medium term time 
scale 
Joint projects 
cooperation 
Small to medium  
advantage for few 
large projects 
Maintain own 
support systems and 
secondary objectives 
Transaction costs, 
Lack of 
transparency, 
Legal requirements 
because of lack of 
legislation 
Target technologies 
with large project size 
Short term time 
scale 
Joint projects 
support 
framework 
Medium Maintain own 
support systems and 
secondary objectives 
Transaction costs 
lower than for 
single project  
Identify 
technologies/areas 
where standardisation 
easy and many small 
projects works better 
than a few large 
Medium term time 
scale 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the cooperation mechanisms, the 
barriers and possible solutions. The following sections explain single barriers related to different 
support schemes and power market effects in more detail. 
 
3.1 Barriers as a consequence of different RES support systems 
and policy objectives 
There are considerable barriers related to differences in support systems between countries, but 
just as important is the barrier from a difference in the level (cost) of support. Differences in 
support systems cover feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, green certificates or tendering auctions 
as well as differences in technology coverage with technology banding or technology-specific 
support level. 
Cooperation between countries with different support systems can be initiated in two ways of 
which one is moving in the direction of harmonising the two support systems/schemes. The other 
option is to progress with different systems but initiate cooperation based on cooperation projects 
or just using the statistical transfer to exploit imbalances realised ex post in 2020. The first case 
will require very substantial changes to legislation and institutional arrangements where 
adjustments costs and time lags are considerable barriers. In the second case with project-based 
cooperation, these costs and time lags are less, but the transaction costs and administrative 
burdens in order to have sufficient volume in projects can be substantial unless standardisation is 
widely possible. Statistical transfers have the lowest barriers, but they cannot ensure additional 
RES in time or the relocation of RES development.    
As countries often apply different support schemes targeting different technologies [17], barriers 
will arise when determining which support scheme to apply in the cooperation, independent on 
whether the two countries agree on going in the direction of harmonising their support systems 
or they agree on project-based cooperation. In the following, we examine barriers that may arise 
as a consequence of different support systems in the cooperating countries. In [16] several 
different combinations have been analysed, but here we include only two of the characteristic 
combinations.  
 Barriers for combining feed-in and green certificate support schemes 
The two support schemes offer different properties with regard to the volumes realised and the 
support costs. Feed-in does not control the volume and could generate both excess and deficit 
results relative to 2020 RES targets. Green certificate schemes require a broader range of 
conditions fulfilled to work well, of which the liquidity and transparency of the market is most 
difficult to satisfy. Combing the two is possible with feed-in for some technologies, where the 
countries prioritise their secondary objectives such as PV industry development and a common 
certificate system for other technologies. The main barrier is that the feed-in easily offer 
technology specific support level and the certificates would work best with competition between 
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technologies. One option to combine the two schemes is to introduce technology banding in a 
common certificate scheme and another option is to combine a certificate scheme with feed-in 
tariffs or premiums for a few technologies or installation sizes. In either case, there is a trade-off 
between the efficiency of the scheme to promote the cheapest options and the degree to which 
the combined scheme is supporting diversified technologies. Barriers arise as a feed-in tariff 
supports the purpose of developing infant domestic industries, conflicting with the idea of 
implementing RES development where it is cheapest, which certificates would support. If 
technology banding (technology specific support) motivated by concerns such as security of 
supply, diversification of power technologies etc. is desired, a feed in tariff is often the preferred 
instrument. Feed-in tariffs and premiums generally offer less risk in the support revenue to 
investors, whereas the certificate revenue is heavily dependent on if there is a political 
commitment to increase the renewable obligations over time. Smaller investors would normally 
favour the feed-in to the certificate scheme if the intended level of support is in the same range.  
 Barriers for combining feed-in and tendering schemes 
Feed-in schemes work well with both smaller and larger projects, but are inflexible in providing 
the market incentive to increase or cut back on RES deployment speed. Tendering works well 
with larger projects that require interaction with governmental/TSO planning of infrastructure 
and localisation of investment etc. Feed-in and tendering is often combined with a fixed support 
at the time of settling with the tender winners, but new tenders are not bound with any level of 
feed-in tariff. The actual expansion of renewables can thus be controlled contrary to a feed-in. In 
cases where the tenders are for additional high-cost RES options and can be used for cooperation 
and RES certificate exchange, the combination of tenders and a general feed-in could work.  
3.2 Barriers related to differences in support levels  
Differences in support levels create barriers as they are expressing the different willingness of 
society to pay for renewable expansion. Harmonising different support levels necessarily means 
that the renewable investment opportunities in the country of high support level are reduced (see 
Box 1). Renewable industry, green development supporters and renewable investors would all 
oppose the reduction of support levels even though it is the cooperation benefit that reduce costs 
and therefore enable more ambitious RES targets in the future. Likewise the country with low 
support would have important opposition against the increase in support cost for their RES 
development especially if the burden is directly levied over consumers. 
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Box 1 Example: Barriers related to differences in support level 
 
 
3.3 Barriers related to targets over time 
Uncertainty about more ambitious post-2020 targets can be another hindrance to attaining 2020 
targets jointly. If cheap resources are predominantly in one country (A), a common support 
scheme may ‘sell’ these resources to the neighbour B at a low price. At a later point in time, 
higher RES targets cannot be obtained by A alone because low-price locations are blocked. Thus, 
choosing an international support solution may impact the possible future choices negatively 
from a unilateral point of view.  
For example, Germany and Spain could decide to cooperate on a joint support scheme for 
new photovoltaic (PV) installations. The two support schemes are currently rather similar, 
featuring a differentiated feed-in tariff. Spain recently introduced a capacity cap, limiting the 
support of new PV installations, because they feared a too high increase of their overall RES 
support cost. At the same time, there is a significant build-out of PV in Germany to a much 
higher RES support cost. Assuming a joint support system, where Germany and Spain would 
have one common market for PV at an adequate common support level, the build-out of PV 
would move from Germany to Spain (due to the much better solar radiation levels). The 
overall support cost would be reduced by the difference of the required support cost in 
Germany to the required support cost in Spain. Germany and Spain would then share the RES 
certificates and the support cost. However, finding the right cost allocation would be a 
difficult negotiation. Germany would have a significant reduction in support cost (per 
generated unit of renewable energy), but would also lose local benefits. Spain would need to 
be compensated for bearing all physical and market integration issues, but would have all 
local benefits including the innovation and industry benefits, which currently seems to be a 
significant factor in Germany’s PV support considerations. 
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Figure 1: Marginal costs of RES extension in countries A and B over time 
 
The picture could be different if the marginal costs of RES extension in the two countries 
intersect, as illustrated in Figure 1. The figure displays the marginal costs of RES extension of 
two countries A and B over time t and the RES amount Q. Until the intersection at Q0/t0, RES 
extension can be achieved at lower cost in B, and vice versa. In such a constellation, a 
cooperation could be politically more acceptable for both parties because A receives access to 
low-cost resources in the short run while B secures access to lower-cost resources in the long run 
(beyond Q0). The joint support scheme could be a quota mechanism, a feed-in tariff scheme or a 
price premium scheme. As for all support schemes, basic features such as geographical and 
technological scope and a time horizon for its applicability need to be defined. A tendering 
scheme could also be suitable for a number of large-scale technologies such as offshore wind 
power. If support is granted over a certain time horizon, e.g. 15 years, this extends beyond the 
2020 targets. Support to units in a neighbouring country may then have to be provided on an 
annual basis, although the support does only contribute to fulfilling RES for 2020. 
3.4 Barriers associated with power market regulation, composition 
of technologies and price levels 
This subsection addresses the following topics: 
 Difference in network regulation (incentive regulation) approach 
 Difference in power market design/functioning 
 Difference in power market price and price volatility 
 Difference in generation mix and mix of RES technologies 
 Barriers related to network regulation 
Network regulation varies a great deal between member states from rate of return to incentive 
based price and revenue caps. The details in incentive regulation include numerous differences 
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and the enforcement of regulation is not always effective. Network regulation has impacts on the 
incentives to facilitate efficient connection of new technologies and network reinforcements [18]. 
If national regulation allows networks to include reinforcement investments caused by renewable 
generation in their capital base and thereby their revenue cap, this cost will be borne by the 
network customers. In the case of cooperation, the country providing the RES credits will require 
the receiving country to compensate also for this cost, but the transfer to network customers in 
the receiving country seem very difficult to realise. Box 2 gives a short example how the 
network connection could be used as a trade-off option. 
Box 2 Example: Connection costs as a barrier and possible solutions 
 
 Barriers related to power market characteristics 
Power markets differ even though they are in many cases coupled and therefore prices to some 
extent are correlated.  Differences in market concentration and technology composition create 
some barriers. The mix of technologies in power generation can be more or less flexible to adjust 
to short term changes in renewable generation. This can constitute an important barrier in a 
country if the inflexibility of the existing generation capacity is combined with adding more 
fluctuating renewable generation than necessary for national purposes.   
 Barriers related to power price effects 
Power price level and volatility differ and create additional barriers. Price levels in some 
countries will not be affected considerably by increasing or decreasing the renewable expansion, 
whereas a neutral price zone between two countries is subject to a comparatively low-price 
profile [19]. However, countries where renewable expansion potentials are abundant and cheap 
could experience considerable changes in power prices and corresponding deterioration in 
profitability of existing conventional and renewable capacity. It is a difficult task to compensate 
the firms/producers that lose with the gains that consumers experience in terms of lower prices. 
At the same time, the country facing the reduced prices will probably have to look for alternative 
ways to provide incentives for future investment in conventional capacity. Furthermore, there is 
a risk of increasing curtailment of renewable generators both in the short run and permanently by 
expanding fluctuating renewable at a fast pace. If curtailment is necessary, the issue of 
compensation to generators has to be agreed upon. [20] suggest that this should be with respect 
to primary dispatch: if this has been granted historically, compensation needs to follow, whereas 
the curtailment risk may stay with generators in a more liberalised market environment. 
The sharing of connection costs seems to offer benefits from a practical point of view: if a 
joint support scheme refers to an offshore area and is connected to several countries, the 
involved TSOs need to agree on a division of investment costs. This may be done 
proportionally to expected national benefits and could also comprise further effects arising 
from a joint support scheme. 
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4. Cooperation with uncertain future RES targets  
One of the important barriers for cooperation lies in the uncertainty regarding the post 2020 
targets for RES shares. The uncertainty influences the value of the possible RES credits from 
generation after 2020. Expecting tighter (higher) targets after 2020 will make excess countries 
reluctant to sell their relatively cheap RES options off. Countries in deficit considering buying 
credits will be reluctant to support foreign long term investments in RES without certainty that 
the generation credits after 2020 have any value. [21] also stress the importance of post 2020 
targets and that cooperation and collaboration initiatives intended for that period will enhance 
also the prospects for achieving the 2020 targets.  
Table 2 illustrates an exemplary cooperation setting for two countries A and B with differences 
in RES technology costs (column 2), power market price (column 3) and necessary support cost 
on top of the expected power prices in each country (column 4). The example demonstrate that 
the issue of uncertain future RES targets has important implications for the cooperation 
attractiveness where one country is partly or fully financing the necessary support for renewable 
projects in another country. The uncertainty about the future target is illustrated by varying the 
value (column 6) that country A in which the development takes place assigns to credits after 
2020.  
The examples show the effect on the RES credits transfer price based on the value per generated 
unit in 2020. The assumptions underlying the calculations in Table 2 are: a technology lifetime 
of 15 years, annual generation 4100 full load hours from 2020, no discounting, constant real 
prices and support levels. The most crucial assumptions are the RES technology costs in column 
2 and the expected value of future credits in column 6. For all levels of expected credit value, the 
calculations are carried out with and without a physical transfer of the generated electricity to the 
other market. The cost of interconnection capacity is not included in calculations. 
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Table 2 Examples of RES credits prices with permanent or single year transfer, 200 MW offshore wind  
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 c€/kWh €/MWh c€/kWh Mill. € c€/kWh Mill. € c€/kWh 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 0 984 120 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 0 701 85 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 2 754 92 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 2 472 58 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 4 525 64 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 4 242 30 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 6 295 36 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 6 12 2 
Country A  14 40 10.0 1230 4 771 94 
Country B 15 63 7.7 947 4 488 60 
a
: for the entire lifetime of the technology. With and without physical transfer (in italic) 
b
: assuming the support for the entire lifetime of the technology is paid in one single year, 2020 
 
The last column is expressing the total lifetime support payments financed by country B per 
generated unit in one single year, namely 2020. These are in most cases much higher than the 
necessary support costs per generation unit for the entire lifetime as illustrated in column 4. If the 
support financed by country B covers the entire necessary support because country A assigns no 
value to future credits, this corresponds to country B buying all the credits at the price of 
5.7c€/kWh as in row 3. Such a situation can be expected for many bilateral cooperation 
possibilities in the EU. For most countries, the value of future RES credits will be rather low, but 
some countries might expect much higher RES targets for the future or they might have national 
targets that exceed the 2020 target set by the EU directive. This is for example the case for 
Denmark that has set higher targets for renewable shares post 2020. 
As such, the basic cost savings from cooperation are found as the difference between RES 
generation costs in country A and country B. This is the cost differential in column 2 which is 
3c€/kWh, except the alternative in the last two rows with only a 1c€/kWh cost difference. 
Adding interconnection capacity between the two countries increase the gross benefit (italic 
figures) but it is not a result of the cooperation project and could have been achieved without the 
RES project. If there is much larger RES expansion than in the present 200MW example, there 
might be a downward effect on market prices in country A. This would increase the price 
differential and make the addition of interconnection capacity more economically attractive.  
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In reality, the transfer price will be a result of a negotiation process and the example of 29.5 
c€/kWh (see Box 3) is a minimum price as the price has to be higher if country A should have a 
net benefit from the cooperation. 
Box 3 Transfer price for 2020 credits including physical transfer, row 7 
 
    
The last two rows in the table illustrate a situation where there is only a minor difference 
between the technology costs in countries A and B. The result is that the transfer price for 2020 
will be high and the domestic expansion of RES in country B will be more efficient than 
expanding RES in country A even though the technology costs are lower here. The value of the 
generated electricity is simply higher in country B than in country A.  
One consequence of the uncertainty regarding the future target is that renewable technologies 
with the shortest lifetime will be favoured as the total costs per generated unit in 2020 will be the 
least. 
An EU policy for the future RES targets, which as a minimum establishes   future targets  at the 
level agreed for 2020, would reduce the uncertainty of post 2020 RES credits value. Such an 
announcement may facilitate cooperation just by reducing the uncertainty and contribute to 
reaching the 2020 RES targets at a lower aggregate cost. 
 
The common Swedish-Norwegian certificate scheme effective from 2012 is one solution to 
reduce the cooperation barriers created by different support systems. The common system with 
an obligation for both countries post 2020 results in a price uncertainty for fulfilling the RES 
target that is similar for the two cooperating countries and not with opposite sign as in the case 
discussed above. Other countries have been addressing this option [7] in order to reduce their 
2020 compliance costs. Despite a large number of common characteristics in Norway and 
Sweden, such as a common wholesale power market and a comparable geology for hydro 
reservoirs, it has required lengthy negotiations since 2005 before an agreement was reached. The 
 Calculation of the transfer price for 2020 credits with physical transfer as in row 7 can be 
exemplified by first calculating the necessary support (column 4): 
(Technology cost in A (12c€/kWh) – market price in B (6.3c€/kWh)) * 4100 hours/year* 
200MW *1000 kWh/MWh * 15 years = 701.1 mill. €.  
Of this support, A will be willing to contribute up to the expected value of 4c€/kWh for the 
remaining 14 years of generation: 200MW * 1000 kWh/MWh * 14 years * 4c€/kWh = 459.2 
mill. €. 
Then B will have to pay 701.1 mill. € - 459.2 mill. € = 242 mill. € for the RES generation 
credits in 2020. This corresponds to 242 mill. €/(200MW * 1000 kWh/MWh * 4100h) = 29.5 
c€/kWh.  
16 
 
main reason for this first failure was that cost attribution could not be agreed upon between the 
two involved countries. The producers of renewable certificates are approved in the home 
country (Sweden or Norway). Certificates will be assigned up to 15 years after initialization – 
though only until 2035. It is up to each country to decide who should buy certificates – and 
which kind of consumption should pay for the certificates. The certificate system is designed to 
last from the period January first 2012 until December 31 2035, reaching the maximum 
obligation levels in 2019 and 2020 after which the renewable shares are set to decline gradually. 
Facing this initiative of a joint support scheme, other countries as the Netherlands [22] have 
investigated if an association to this joint scheme was possible and beneficial to them. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Renewable electricity potentials and costs vary considerably among EU countries. These 
variations in combination with differences in power market structure and price levels must be 
included when examining the benefit of cooperating on meeting the 2020 EU RES targets.  
The potential benefits of cooperation on reaching the 2020 RES targets are of considerable size, 
but the barriers for realising these potential savings are of similar size. Table 1 sums up the 
characteristics and issues specifically involved for each type of cooperation mechanism. The 
conclusion is that the joint projects are the simplest in terms of need to change regulation and 
legislation and therefore can be implemented in a shorter time frame. This type of cooperation 
has its advantage for larger projects such as tendered off-shore wind farms, whereas the smaller 
projects would involve relatively more administrative costs in negotiating and designing 
individual contracts. In case of smaller projects, this could be possible if standardisation of 
contracts and conditions is possible.  
The most important barriers are associated with the different objectives of renewable policy 
priorities of the countries. The large differences in existing support schemes, power markets and 
power sector regulation also form considerable barriers. One specific important barrier is the 
large uncertainty regarding the future RES targets. Financing RES expansion in another country 
just to meet the RES targets for one single year in 2020 can be very costly as demonstrated in 
Table 2. 
The simplest solutions in terms of maintaining existing legislation and domestic support 
schemes, but adding new dimensions for support will be the easiest and fastest to implement. 
Here we suggest to look into larger projects for project based cooperation and the joint support 
schemes added on top of national support schemes for specific technologies or areas/regions.  
Cooperation mechanisms involving countries with similar priorities and large differences in 
compliance costs seem the easiest to implement. In this case, even the harmonised single joint 
support scheme could be a solution to start moving towards, by defining compensation principles 
and methods and preparing the national markets for the change. 
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Joint project cooperation where there are both benefits from difference in RES technology costs 
and benefits from expected difference in power market prices and physical market transfer will 
have the best chances for being implemented. However negotiating the transfer price for credits 
in 2020 is difficult especially since the country binding targets post 2020 are unknown and the 
value of future generated RES credits therefore very uncertain. This may lead to a sub-optimal 
preference for projects with a short lifetime. Announcing some direction for the future binding 
targets of EU would improve on this situation and reduce this barrier for cooperation. 
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